In State v. Randolph & Company Bail Bonds, 2010 WL 3447411 (Ariz.App. August 31, 2010) the defendant failed to appear for arraignment but the court vacated and reset the arraignment date.  When he again failed to appear, the court issued a bench warrant and he was arrested later that day.  At the bail forfeiture hearing, a non-lawyer representative of the bail agency appeared but did not object to the court’s use of the first nonappearance date to forfeit the bond.  On appeal of a judgment forfeiting the bond, the Court held that the objection was waived by not being presented in the trial court and that the surety’s appearance by a non-lawyer was effectively a failure to appear.  Having failed to appear, the surety did not meet its burden of establishing good cause for the defendant’s default.  This is the third recent Arizona case refusing to let the non-lawyer bail bond agent represent the surety in the trial court.

US Jail to Fire LASERS at Violent Prisoners

It’s a non-lethal laser as you probably guessed, but nonetheless, the Assault Intervention Device (measuring 2.2m in height) causes some serious heat when shot at an escapee or fighty prisoner.

From this week, the Pitchess Detention Center will be using it to scare 65 of its 3,700 prisoners, mounting it high up a dormitory wall as an ominous warning against bad behaviour. It’s activated by a joystick, with the laser beam more the size of a CD than a pinpoint like normal lasers.

Any human rights readers up in arms at this news will be pleased to know that prison wardens actually tested the laser on themselves, with Commander Bob Osborne commenting that it’s like “opening an oven door and feeling that blast of hot air, except instead of being all over me, it’s more focused.”

In United States v. Powell, 2010 WL 2557388 (N.D.Cal. June 21, 2010) the Magistrate Judge rejected the Government’s argument that the sureties on an appearance bond must demonstrate assets adequate to cover the bond amount.  The Magistrate Judge held that she could order an “unsecured” appearance bond pursuant to the catch-all provision of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §3142(c)(1)(xiv): “any other condition that is reasonably necessary” to assure the defendant’s appearance and community safety.

In Arroyo v. Bajramj , 2010 WL 2682750 (Conn.Super. May 26, 2010) a bail agent sued the defendant for an allegedly unpaid balance of the premium.  The parties agreed that bonds totaling $215,000 were provided, $6,450 was paid in cash, and the defendant appeared as required.  The issue was any unpaid balance of the premium.  The documents submitted by the plaintiff were notable for uncompleted blanks and references to security for appearance rather than premium amounts.  They did not state an unpaid premium balance.  The plaintiff argued he was owed $9,150 plus attorneys fees and relied on Conn. G.S. §29-151, which the court found stated a maximum premium but did not set a minimum amount.  The defendant, however, admitted that after he was released he agreed to pay another $2,500 and the court found support for a $150 “B.U.F. Fund” assessment.  The court entered judgment for $2,650 and no attorneys fees.

What to do when your 21 year old is thrown in jail for the 5th time in 3 months on prostitution charges?  Starky should probably stop hooking.   She can’t seem to stop attracting the police in whichever city she tries to ply her trade.  If anyone has a job for her, please contact us.  Someone needs to help.

Read more: Whittier bail bondsman arrested for grand theft – Whittier Daily News http://www.whittierdailynews.com/news/ci_15423574#ixzz0sY2XXmUN

Bondsman charged in “referral scheme”

SANTA ANA – A bail bond agent was arrested Thursday and accused of soliciting attorney referrals and inmate business in an illegal bail bond referral scheme.

Ronald Lee Brockway, 50, of Seal Beach, is charged with two felony counts of violating bail license regulations and faces a maximum sentence of three years and eight months in state prison.

He is being held on $50,000 bail pending his arraignment.

California law prohibits bail bond employees from soliciting bail business from any inmate or incarcerated person, according to a news release from the Orange County District Attorney’s Office. The law also prohibits bail bond employees from recommending any attorney to any bail bond client, even if no money changes hands.

Brockway is accused of sending numerous e-mails to attorneys soliciting them to participate in an illegal bail bond scheme with his company, Respect Bail Bond, according to the news release.

In his messages, Brockway is accused of suggesting that the attorneys refer bail bond business to him, while offering to refer clients to the attorneys in order to “increase both of our earnings substantially,” prosecutors said.

Brockway is also accused of unlawfully soliciting business from inmates by mass mailing flyers to the Orange County jail containing the name and contact information for Respect Bail Bond. The flyers read, “Get out of jail today by calling now!”

In October 2005, Brockway testified in an Orange County Grand Jury hearing that he had received cash payments from attorney Joseph Cavallo in exchange for referring arrestees to Cavallo’s law practice.

Brockway was not prosecuted in that case because his testimony was needed in the prosecution of other defendants, prosecutors said.

Cavallo was indicted based partly on Brockway’s testimony. Cavallo pleaded guilty on Oct. 12, 2007, to conspiracy to engage in attorney capping, or paying for clients, and an illegal attorney referral scheme. He was sentenced to six months in jail on Dec. 14, 2007.

The District Attorney’s Bureau of Investigation began investigating the current case after a private attorney contacted the OCDA to report receiving the e-mail from Brockway regarding the illegal referral scheme.

Contact the writer: lwelborn@ocregister.com or 714-834-3784

In County of Los Angeles v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. , 2010 WL 2373364 (Cal.App. June 15, 2010) the defendant repeatedly failed to appear, but his counsel represented that the defendant had health problems.  Eventually the court declared a forfeiture and entered summary judgment on the bond.  The surety moved to set aside the summary judgment and exonerate the bond.  The court denied the motion 126 days after the motion was filed, and the surety appealed.  The appeal was filed 175 days after notice of entry of the summary judgment.  The Court dismissed the appeal as untimely.  The surety argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it failed to forfeit the bond when the defendant first failed to appear without sufficient excuse.  The Court held that the trial court had fundamental jurisdiction and may only have acted in excess of its jurisdiction.  Therefore, the summary judgment became final when the appeal period expired, and it was not subject to collateral attack by the surety’s motion to set it aside.

In County of Los Angeles v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., 2010 WL 2373364 (Cal.App. June 15, 2010) the defendant repeatedly failed to appear, but his counsel represented that the defendant had health problems. Eventually the court declared a forfeiture and entered summary judgment on the bond. The surety moved to set aside the summary judgment and exonerate the bond. The court denied the motion 126 days after the motion was filed, and the surety appealed. The appeal was filed 175 days after notice of entry of the summary judgment. The Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. The surety argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it failed to forfeit the bond when the defendant first failed to appear without sufficient excuse. The Court held that the trial court had fundamental jurisdiction and may only have acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Therefore, the summary judgment became final when the appeal period expired, and it was not subject to collateral attack by the surety’s motion to set it aside.

In People v. Sanchez , 2010 WL 2224699 (Cal.App. June 4, 2010) the defendant failed to appear for arraignment on April 1, 2008.  Defense counsel said that he told the defendant of the date but that there may have been confusion over 4/1/08 versus 4/18.  The court did not forfeit the bond and continued the matter to April 18.  When the defendant failed to appear on the 18^th , the court forfeited the bond and issued a bench warrant.  The Court rejected the surety’s argument that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it failed to forfeit the bond on April 1.  The Court thought that the defendant’s record of appearing on numerous prior occasions and counsel’s explanation were sufficient to prevent the trial court’s action from being arbitrary or capricious.  The trial court acted within its discretion.  The Court also rejected the surety’s argument that there was no court order directing the defendant to appear on the 18^th.  The operative date was April 1, when he had been ordered to appear.

The surety also argued that the defendant was detained in Mexico but the prosecutor had not entered the warrant in the NCIC system and would not seek extradition.  The Court thought that the record failed to establish that the warrant was not entered in the NCIC database or that, if it had been entered, the Mexican authorities would have held the defendant.  Similarly, the Court thought the record did not show that the prosecutor’s office refused to seek extradition as opposed to failed to produce extradition documents immediately.  The Court characterized the record as showing “coordination between agencies that was slow to progress due to various employees being on vacation” rather than an election not to extradite.  [Not published].

Safety National Casualty Corp. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security , 2010 WL 2219162 (S.D.Tex. May 28, 2010) addressed five issues that the parties could not resolve in their ongoing ADR procedure as follows: (1) a premature “run letter” bars a breach even if not received by the principal.  (2) If the box requesting notice to both the surety and the agent is checked but the same address is listed for both, the government can comply by sending separate notices or by sending a single notice addressed to both at the common address.  One notice addressed to one recipient, however, is not compliance.  (3) This “notice to both” defense had to be raised in administrative proceedings to be preserved, and such exhaustion of administrative remedies was not excused as futile.  (4) No bond involved in the case presented the issue of a “home grown” run letter not on Form I-166, therefore the court could not decide whether a premature such letter would bar breach of the bond.  And, (5) the surety was entitled to assert offsets or credits to reduce the amount claimed by the government, but bond forfeitures the surety paid voluntarily could not be the basis for such an offset or credit.

In State v. Giusini , 2010 WL 2196001 (N.J.Super.A.D. June 2, 2010) the defendant failed to appear and the bond was forfeited.  The following month, he was arrested on a traffic charge in another county.  The court converted the bench warrant to a detainer and reinstated the bond without the surety’s knowledge or consent.  While the defendant remained in custody in the other county, the surety’s agent filed a pro se motion to reinstate and discharge the bond.  That motion was never ruled on, but a few days later the defendant was returned and released on the reinstated bond.  The defendant again failed to appear, and a judgment was entered on the bond.  The surety appealed, and the Appellate Division recognized that the court could not increase the surety’s risk without the surety’s consent.  Here, at the time the court erroneously reinstated the bond, the defendant was in custody and had been a fugitive for only four weeks.  The surety could have refused to reinstate the bond and sought remission pursuant to the remittitur guidelines.  Instead, the surety was exposed to a far higher risk when the defendant again failed to appear in court.  Therefore, applying basic principles of suretyship law, the Court held that reinstatement of the bond increased the surety’s risk.  The Court remanded the case for remission of the amount forfeited considered as of the date the bond was reinstated.  For purposes of remission, the Court directed the trial court to apply the Guidelines as if the defendant was in custody after only four weeks as a fugitive and not to have committed a new crime because traffic offenses are not crimes.  The county argued that the surety agent’s motion was consent to reinstate the bond, but the court interpreted it as an attempt to extinguish any further risk based on the defendant’s failure to appear.