Los Angeles Bail Bonds …just another day

Company fined for bail bond violations

September 7th, 2010, 2:47 pm · Post a Comment · posted by Bill Radford

International Fidelity Insurance Co., a Colorado-regulated casualty company based in New Jersey, has been fined $442,000 for numerous violations of insurance law related to its Colorado bail bond business, the state Division of Insurance reported Tuesday.

International Fidelity is licensed to provide a range of surety bonds in Colorado, but the recent market conduct examination focused only on its bail bond business, the agency said.

Issues addressed in the examination report include:

•  Failure to handle funds in a fiduciary capacity,

•  Failure to appropriately contract with all agents,

•  Failure to require bail bond agents to complete required documentation,

•  Failure to include all required information on documentation related to the issuance of bail bonds, and

•  Failure to properly document deviations from filed rates.

In Goodfellas Bail Bonds v. State, 2010 WL 3463385 (Nev. May 7, 2010) the trial court entered a judgment against the surety and the surety appealed.  The Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and repeated its holding in International Fidelity Insurance Co. v. State, 126 P.3d 1133 (2006) that there is no jurisdiction to appeal “an order denying a motion to remit surety bond or any other order entered in an ancillary bail bond proceeding.” (Emphasis by the Court).

In State v. Padilla, 2010 WL 3396902 (Minn.App. August 31, 2010) the defendant failed to appear, an order was entered forfeiting the bond, and a copy of the order was mailed to the agent but not to the surety.  The agent and surety moved to reinstate and discharge the bond because the notice required by Minn.R.GenPrac. 702(e) was not given to the surety and the “bondsman.”  The trial court reinstated the bond because the surety was not given notice but refused to discharge it.  Instead, the court gave the surety and agent 30 days to request a hearing.  The court denied a renewed motion to discharge and entered an order forfeiting the bond.  The surety and agent appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that under the Rule “bondsman” was the entity issuing the bond, not the specific employee signing it, and so the requirement of notice to the “bondsman” was met by sending notice to the agent.  The trial court’s reinstatement and 30 days notice cured any prejudice to the surety from the initial failure to notify it.  At the second hearing, the surety did not produce the defendant and has not recovered him.  Applying the Shetsky factors, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to discharge the bond.

(AP) – 20 hours ago

LEXINGTON, S.C. — A South Carolina bail bondsman has been charged with forcing a woman to cook, clean and do sexual favors for him in exchange for getting her out of jail.

Lexington County Sheriff James Metts said Tuesday that 51-year-old Curtis Maroney told the 39-year-old woman he would revoke her bond if she didn’t obey his commands.

After five days, investigators say Maroney drove the woman to visit her children at her father’s home and she called deputies.

Maroney is charged with blackmail and trafficking in persons. He remains in the Lexington County jail. Bond has not been set and it’s not clear if he has an attorney.

Metts says the woman had been arrested for driving under the influence and spent 12 days in jail before Maroney posted her $16,000 bond.

In State v. Nelson, 2010 WL 3220156 (Minn.App. August 17, 2010) the defendant was apprehended by law enforcement personnel two months after he failed to appear.  The surety did not contribute to his re-capture.  The trial court initially reinstated the bond but imposed a 50% penalty because the surety did not serve the defendant with notice of the hearings on its motion to reinstate and discharge the bond.  The Court of Appeals reversed that decision in an opinion reported at 773 N.W.2d 330 (Minn.App. 2009).  Following remand, and without holding a further hearing, the trial court issued an order reviewing the factors for a penalty following reinstatement of a bond (the Shetsky factors) and reached the same result that it had before, i.e. a 50% penalty.  The surety appealed the trial court’s refusal to hold a new hearing and its forfeiture of 50% of the bond.  The Court held that the original two hearings gave the surety ample opportunity to present whatever evidence it had and that the trial court’s application of the Shetsky factors was not an abuse of discretion.  In particular, the surety’s failure to make good faith efforts to apprehend the defendant during the two months in which he was a fugitive supported the trial court’s decision.

In People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co. , 2010 WL 3009588 (Cal.App. August 3, 2010) the defendant fled to Mexico.  A few days before expiration of the extended appearance period, the surety learned that the defendant had been arrested in Mexico and confined to a town there.  The surety filed a motion to toll the running of the appearance period either because the confinement was a temporary disability pursuant to Penal Code §1305(e) or on equitable grounds.  The trial court denied relief and entered summary judgment against the surety.  On appeal, the Court accepted that confinement could be a temporary disability but rejected the surety’s argument because the defendant was not absent based upon the temporary disability.  The Court held: “We accordingly construe section 1305(e) as follows.  A detention occurs where civil authorities restrain a defendant, whether by physical apprehension or by force of law.  A defendant is ‘temporarily disable[d] by reason of’ the detention (§1305(e)(1)) when the operation of law is the direct cause of a defendant’s failure to appear . . . However, a detention has not prevented the defendant’s appearance under section 1305(e) when it merely buttresses the preexisting direct cause, such as where a defendant voluntarily flees to a country to which the bail agents cannot travel . . . “  The Court found that the evidence provided by the surety, unauthenticated E-mails, was insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion in finding that the defendant was not absent from the court based on his confinement in Mexico.  The Court also found that the record was inadequate to compel granting equitable tolling of the appearance period.  No reporter’s transcript was provided, so the Court did not know the basis on which the trial court rejected the surety’s motion for equitable tolling.  The Court declined to address the merits of the surety’s equitable tolling argument because of the surety’s failure to provide an adequate record.  [Not Published].

In Casteneda v. State , 2010 WL 3030973 (Tex.App. – San Antonio August 4, 2010) the surety filed an answer to the rule to show cause but did not appear for the hearing.  The court entered a final judgment forfeiting the bond, and the surety did not pursue an appeal.  Instead, the surety filed a bill of review as a separate cause.  The trial court denied relief and the surety appealed.  The Court found no just cause for the surety not to have raised its defenses in a direct appeal of the judgment and so no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying the separate bill of review.  The Court affirmed the judgment without considering the surety’s alleged defense on the merits of the case.

In United States v. Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds and Insurance Agency, Inc., 2010 WL 2985545 (N.D.Cal. July 27, 2010) the Government sued an agent and surety to collect on certain immigration bonds and the defendants counterclaimed.  The court held that the bonds were three party contracts among the surety, the United States and the principal and that there was Tucker Act jurisdiction over the surety’s counterclaim to recover money paid on forfeited bonds.  The court also, however, held that the Department of Homeland Security’s administrative procedure for declaring a breach of the bond and for an administrative appeal of that declaration was valid and the court’s review would be on the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedures Act.  The court rejected the surety’s contention that it was entitled to a de novo determination of its liability but did hold that the surety was entitled to discovery of the alien’s “A-file.” The surety could use information from the file to help show that the Government’s determination of a breach was arbitrary and capricious because it did not consider all pertinent information or did not follow the law, regulations, agreements or other authority.

In Villasana v. City of Houston , 2010 WL 2991095 (S.D.Tex. July 26, 2010) an attorney who acted as bail bond surety for his clients in the City’s Municipal Court filed a purported civil rights action against the City and several of its employees objecting to the City’s attempts to compel payment on forfeited bonds that he alleged he had been told would not have to be paid.  The suit sought to enjoin the City from refusing to accept the attorney’s bonds, to exonerate all bonds written during a certain time period, and to have any subsequent bonds processed “in accordance with due process.”  The defendants moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.  The court recited some confusion as to procedures on such bonds but found no basis for a claim that the City’s actions were substantively or procedurally unfair and no basis to relieve the attorney from his obligations.  The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

There has been an uptick lately in bail scams in Los Angeles County.  Yesterday afternoon, as a client was getting out of their car to come into my office in El Monte, a truck pulled up and asked the people if they were getting a bail bond (talk about gorilla marketing!).  They told them not to go into my office, they can write the bond.  They proceeded to tell them that they could do it faster (I guess because they were on the street) and would do it for a $1,000 discount (which is illegal, by the way).  The public needs to be aware of these people and not deal with “bail agents” who work out of their car on the streets.  The bail industry has a hard enough time keeping it’s image above water without these hoodlums running around making us all look like decrepit, money grubbing, con artists.

Apparently this may come to pass.

I have a client who had a traffic ticket.  He was given a fine by the Court and told to pay it by a certain date.  On that date, he asked for an extension.  On the extension date, he asked for another extension.  On the date of the extension’s extension, he did not bring the money to pay his fine.  The Judge, clearly upset, took him into custody and set bail at $25,000.

When we contacted the Los Angeles County Jail to get the bail information, they informed us there was an INS hold on him.  I contacted the family and found out that he was having issues with his visa.  He already had an attorney and had a hearing date set for a few weeks down the road.

He now sits in the County Jail, unable to make bail, waiting to see if he gets deported.  Strange, but true.

In United States v. Powell, 2010 WL 2557388 (N.D.Cal. June 21, 2010) the Magistrate Judge rejected the Government’s argument that the sureties on an appearance bond must demonstrate assets adequate to cover the bond amount.  The Magistrate Judge held that she could order an “unsecured” appearance bond pursuant to the catch-all provision of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §3142(c)(1)(xiv): “any other condition that is reasonably necessary” to assure the defendant’s appearance and community safety.

In Arroyo v. Bajramj , 2010 WL 2682750 (Conn.Super. May 26, 2010) a bail agent sued the defendant for an allegedly unpaid balance of the premium.  The parties agreed that bonds totaling $215,000 were provided, $6,450 was paid in cash, and the defendant appeared as required.  The issue was any unpaid balance of the premium.  The documents submitted by the plaintiff were notable for uncompleted blanks and references to security for appearance rather than premium amounts.  They did not state an unpaid premium balance.  The plaintiff argued he was owed $9,150 plus attorneys fees and relied on Conn. G.S. §29-151, which the court found stated a maximum premium but did not set a minimum amount.  The defendant, however, admitted that after he was released he agreed to pay another $2,500 and the court found support for a $150 “B.U.F. Fund” assessment.  The court entered judgment for $2,650 and no attorneys fees.