In State v. Liupaono, 2010 WL 374576 (Hawaii January 6, 2010) the surety appealed from denial of its motion for reconsideration of denial of its motion to set aside forfeiture of its bond. The record, however, did not include a judgment of forfeiture, a motion to set aside forfeiture, or an order denying such a motion. The Court recognized that an order denying a motion to set aside forfeiture of a bail bond would be an appealable final order, but found that on the record before it there was no appealable order and therefore that it lacked jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the appeal.
In Safety National Casualty Corp. v. State, 2010 WL 715246 (Tex.Crim.App. March 3, 2010) the Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision published at 273 S.W.3d 730 (Tex.App. – Houston 2008) and held that an appeal in a bail bond forfeiture case was not subject to the civil appeal filing fees. The Court looked at the predecessors of Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 44.44 and held that although the statute applied the civil action rules to bail bond forfeiture proceedings, the Legislature did not intend to apply the civil fee schedule in such cases. Seven Justices joined in this result and two dissented.
In Dominguez v. Safety National Casualty Corp., 2010 WL 697274 (S.D.Tex. February 23, 2010) the defendant agency and surety filed counterclaims against the plaintiffs alleging that the plaintiffs (and some members of the putative class they purported to represent) breached their immigration bond contracts and were obligated to indemnity the defendants for costs and attorneys fees should the defendants prevail. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion. It had supplemental jurisdiction and the indemnity provision, as interpreted by the defendants, could apply to the case.
In Huntington National Bank v. Lomaz, 2010 WL 702439 (Ohio App. February 26, 2010) a judgment creditor recorded its judgment and sought to foreclose on real property owned by the defendants. The defendants appealed and posted a $92,500 supersedeas bond. The bond was obtained from an agent who used a $50,000 power of attorney for bail bonds and secured the balance with property allegedly owned by the agent. The appeal was eventually dismissed, and after several hearings the trial court entered judgment against the agent and surety, jointly and severally, for $50,000 and against the agent for the balance of the bond amount. On appeal, the agent and surety raised several procedural issues. They also argued that the judgment was not affirmed and, since the property was sold there were no damages to collect from the bond. The surety argued that the power of attorney showed on its face that it was only for bail bonds and the agent had no actual or apparent authority to bind the surety to a supersedeas bond.
The Court rejected each argument and affirmed the judgment. In the trial court the surety and agent were represented by the same attorney (apparently the agent’s attorney) and the surety did not raise the power of attorney issue. The Court held that the plain error doctrine did not allow the surety to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. The Court also thought that the agent prepared the bond and the principal got the benefit of the bond by delaying the foreclosure, so any technical defects in the bond were chargeable to the agent not the innocent judgment creditor. The judgment creditor presented evidence of its damages from the delay caused by the appeal, and the agent did not attack this evidence before the trial court. As such, he waived any objection to it on appeal. The surety and agent had an opportunity to present their evidence and arguments in the trial court and did not raise their various procedural objections there. They could not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Tags: bail, bail agent, criminal, fugitive, jail, los angeles bail bonds, nationwide bail bonds
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